

## Message Text

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ACTION PM-05

INFO OCT-01 ARA-10 ISO-00 NSC-05 SP-02 SS-15 L-03 H-01  
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FM AMEMBASSY PORT AU PRINCE  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9006  
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USCINCLANT NORFOLK VA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 PORT AU PRINCE 2932

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: MASS, MPOL, HA  
SUBJECT: ANNUAL INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE FOR  
HAITI

REF: A) STATE 167901 (R010215Z JUL 78)  
B) 77 PORT AU PRINCE 2546 (152200Z JUL 77)  
C) PORT AU PRINCE A-44 OF JULY 3, 1978 (NOTAL)

SUMMARY. OUR MODEST AND CAREFULLY CIRCUMSCRIBED SECURITY  
ASSISTANCE PROGRAM FOR HAITI SERVES A VARIETY OF SPECIFIC  
U.S. INTERESTS AND SHOULD BE CONTINUED. CONGRESS HAS  
RESTRICTED THE PROGRAM ESSENTIALLY TO AIR/SEA RESCUE  
TRAINING AND SUPPORTIVE FMS EQUIPMENT; IN ADDITION, THERE  
IS A SMALL FMS CASH PROGRAM FOR NON-SOPHISTICATED WEAPONS  
AND IMET SUPPORTS A SMALL PROGRAM OF PROFESSIONAL MANAGE-  
MENT TRAINING. THE GOH UNDERSTANDS PROGRAM IS CLOSELY  
RELATED TO U.S. ASSESSMENT OF IMPROVED HAITIAN PERFORMANCE  
IN MANY AREAS, PARTICULARLY IN HUMAN RIGHTS. SMALL AS  
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THE PROGRAM IS, IT PROVIDES US WITH BETTER ACCESS TO AND  
INFLUENCE WITH THE POLITICALLY IMPORTANT MILITARY LEADER-  
SHIP, ENHANCES HAITI'S CAPACITY TO CARRY OUT SEARCH AND  
RESCUE RESPONSIBILITIES, IMPROVES NAVIGATION FACILITIES,  
AND TENDS TO MAKE THE GOH GENERALLY MORE RESPONSIVE ON  
HUMAN RIGHTS MATTERS. THE PROGRAM CAREFULLY EXCLUDES  
ANYTHING THAT WOULD SIGNIFICANTLY ENHANCE HAITIAN CAPACITY

TO ENGAGE IN DOMESTIC REPRESSION OR MILITARY ADVENTURES AND IN NO WAY CONTRIBUTES TO ARMS TRANSFERS. THE EMBASSY RECOMMENDS THAT THE PROGRAM CONTINUE SO LONG AS GOH MAKES EFFECTIVE USE OF IT, FOLLOWS RESPONSIBLE MILITARY POLICIES, AND CONTINUES TO IMPROVE IN HUMAN RIGHTS AREA. THERE FOLLOWS AN ASSESSMENT OF OUR SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM FOR HAITI KEYED TO REQUESTS IN REFTEL A. END SUMMARY.

1. INTERESTS AND OBJECTIVES. U.S. INTERESTS IN HAITI ARE PRIMARILY TO ASSIST IN ALLEVIATING HAITI'S POVERTY AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT; TO IMPROVE OBSERVANCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS BY THE GOH; TO DIMINISH HAITI'S TRADITIONAL ISOLATION AND TO ENCOURAGE ITS GREATER INVOLVEMENT IN THE REGION. OUR SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM IN HAITI CAN SUPPORT THESE INTERESTS BY DEVELOPING A CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE PROFESSIONAL MILITARY OF HAITI AND, THROUGH THEM, REINFORCING U.S. INFLUENCE ON THE GOH. WITHIN THIS GENERAL GOAL, OUR SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES ARE TO IMPROVE THE PROFESSIONAL QUALITY OF THE HAITIAN MILITARY LEADERSHIP AND TO ENCOURAGE THEM TO PLAY A MORE USEFUL ROLE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF HAITI.

2. THREAT ASSESSMENT. ALTHOUGH THE GOH FACES NO PRESENT THREAT OR ACTIVE INSURGENCY, IT FEARS TWO POTENTIAL THREATS: A CLANDESTINE ARMED STRIKE AT THE LEADERSHIP--PRINCIPALLY SUPPORTED BY EXILES--TO BRING ABOUT A COUP D'ETAT: AND AN

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OUTRIGHT INVASION BY CUBAN OR CUBAN-SUPPORTED FORCES AND/OR HAITIAN EXILES. DESPITE A HISTORY OF UNEASY RELATIONS, THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC IS NOT VIEWED AS A THREAT, ALTHOUGH THERE IS SOME ANXIETY ABOUT POLICIES OF THE SOON-TO-BE-INSTALLED PRD GOVERNMENT. HAITI HAS NO DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH CUBA AND TENDS TO VIEW OTHER LEFT-LEANING NEIGHBORS, SUCH AS MANLEY'S JAMAICA, WITH GREAT SUSPICION. THE GOH LOOKS ON ITSELF AS AN ALLY OF THE UNITED STATES, AS A SMALL NEIGHBOR WARRANTING SPECIAL PROTECTION FROM COMMUNIST SUBVERSION AND IT REMAINS APPREHENSIVE THAT THE COLLECTIVE SECURITY PRINCIPLES OF THE RIO TREATY COULD NOT BE INVOKED QUICKLY IN THE EVENT OF A CUBAN-BACKED INCURSION NOT SUBJECT TO READY IDENTIFICATION AS AGGRESSION OR ARMED ATTACK.

THE STRATEGY TO MEET THESE THREATS IS TRADITIONAL. RELATIVELY TIGHT BORDER SECURITY IS MAINTAINED ALONG THE FRONTIER DIVIDING HAITI AND THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC. COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY SERVICES, COMPOSED MOSTLY OF MEMBERS OF THE REGULAR ARMED FORCES BUT EMPLOYING NUMEROUS INFORMERS, MONITOR OPPOSITION TO THE REGIME AND DO NOT HESITATE TO ARREST THOSE WHOSE ACTIVITIES THEY CONSIDER DANGEROUS. THE NEW 600-MAN LEOPARD BATTALION IS TRAINED AS AN ANTI-GUERRILLA

FORCE AND COULD PROBABLY DEAL WITH AN ATTEMPTED INVASION BY  
HAITIAN EXILES AS WELL AS PUT DOWN AN INTERNAL INSURRECTION.

3. U.S. ASSESSMENT OF THREAT. OUR PERCEPTION OF THE  
THREAT IS GENERALLY THE SAME AS THAT OF THE GOH, EXCEPT THAT  
WE BELIEVE THE GOVERNMENT EXAGGERATES THE LIKELIHOOD OF  
CUBAN INTERVENTION.

4. THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT. THE ARMED FORCES OF HAITI  
ARE DIVIDED INTO TWO CATEGORIES: THE REGULAR ARMED FORCES  
(FAD'H) AND THE PARAMILITARY VOLUNTEERS FOR NATIONAL SECURITY  
(VSN). THIS SEPARATION WAS ESTABLISHED BY FRANCOIS DUVALIER  
WHO CREATED THE VSN AS A COUNTERWEIGHT TO THE FAD'H, WHICH  
ITSELF IS DIVIDED INTO SEVERAL COMPONENTS WHICH OPERATE  
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ALMOST COMPLETELY INDEPENDENTLY FROM THE CENTRAL COMMAND  
STRUCTURE. THE PRIMAR ROLE OF THE ARMED FORCES,BOTH  
REGULAR AND PARMILITARY, IS TO PROTECT THE PRESIDENT AND  
THEREBY PRESERVE THE STATUS QUO. THERE IS A SERIES OF OVER-  
LAPPING LAYERS OF SECURITY THAT SURROUND THE PRESIDENT AND

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MAINTAIN SURVEILLANCE ON EACH OTHER. ALTHOUGH THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT IS FAR FROM A COHESIVE, UNITED BODY THIS SYSTEM HAS, BY AND LARGE, WORKED WELL, HAS RESULTED IN A RELATIVELY LONG PERIOD OF CALM, AND APPARENTLY MEETS GOH REQUIREMENTS.

5. RELATIONSHIP OF MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT TO U.S. INTERESTS. DESPITE THEIR DIVISIONS, THE HAITIAN ARMED FORCES ARE A MAJOR POWER FACTOR IN THE SOCIETY. THEIR LEADERS WOULD BE THE ARBITERS IN ANY SUCCESSION CRISIS AND CAN, AND PROBABLY WILL, PLAY A KEY ROLE IN HAITI'S POLITICAL, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE. IT IS THEREFORE IMPORTANT FOR THE U.S. TO MAINTAIN CONTACT WITH THE MILITARY. TO PROMOTE OUR POLICIES AND OBJECTIVES IN HAITI WE HAVE THE FOLLOWING OPTIONS:

A) CONTINUE OUR PRESENT SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM ALONG ESTABLISHED LINES AND FUNDING OF DEVELOPMENT. ANY INCREASE IN

ASSISTANCE, HOWEVER, SHOULD BE CAREFULLY TAILORED TO COMPLE-  
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MENT THE COUNTRY'S DEVELOPMENT NEEDS. HOWEVER, SHOULD A SIGNIFICANTLY REPRESSIVE TREND SET IN, WORKING AGAINST OUR OBJECTIVE, WE SHOULD REDUCE OR ELIMINATE U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE. THIS OPTION SHOULD BE CONSIDERED ONLY AS A LAST RESORT, BECAUSE ANY SIGNIFICANT AND POLICY-RELATED CUT IN ASSISTANCE COULD LEAD TO A RUPTURE OF ALL CONTACTS WITH THE FAD'H, AND WOULD MAKE IT NEARLY IMPOSSIBLE TO INFLUENCE THE MILITARY LEADERSHIP POSITIVELY OR CONSTRUCTIVELY, NOW OR IN THE FUTURE. THE END RESULT WOULD INEVITABLY HAVE A SHARPLY NEGATIVE IMPACT ON OUR RELATIONS WITH THE GOH AS A WHOLE AND ON THE ACHIEVEMENT OF OUR OBJECTIVES IN HAITI.

6. DEFENSE SPENDING. HAITI'S DEFENSE SPENDING IS LESS THAN EIGHT PERCENT OF THE ANNUAL BUDGETS (CURRENTLY ABOUT \$140 MILLION). BUDGETED DEFENSE EXPENDITURES (ROUGHLY \$11 MILLION) ARE LIMITED TO SALARIES AND TO THE OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE OF THE CURRENT INVENTORY OF EQUIPMENT. PURCHASE OF NEW OR ADDITIONAL EQUIPMENT IS NORMALLY FUNDED BY ONE OR ANOTHER OF THE HUNDREDS OF "SPECIAL" BANK ACCOUNTS MAINTAINED BY THE GOH, WHICH ARE NEVER INCLUDED IN THE BUDGETS (ALTHOUGH THE GOH HAS PROMISED TO DISMANTLE THE SPECIAL ACCOUNT SYSTEM, WHICH HAS RECENTLY ACCOUNTED FOR MORE THAN HALF OF TOTAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES, DURING THE COURSE OF THE FY-79 BUDGET YEAR BEGINNING OCTOBER 1, 1978). EXPENDITURES FOR MILITARY EQUIPMENT, HOWEVER, ARE A MINUTE PORTION OF THE ANNUAL GOVERNMENTAL EXPENDITURES AND HAVE MINIMUM IMPACT ON THE ECONOMY. MORE DIFFICULT TO QUANTIFY, BUT ALMOST CER-

TAINLY MUCH LESS THAN THE \$11 MILLION BUDGETED EXPENDITURES, IS THE COST OF VARIOUS NON-BUDGETED FAVORS AND PERQUISITES-- HOUSES, EXPENSIVE CARS, CUSTOMS CONCESSIONS, PATRONAGE PRIVILEGES, ETC.--SHOWERED ON MILITARY LEADERS TO MAINTAIN THEIR LOYALTY TO THE CURRENT REGIME. NEVERTHELESS, WITH CONFIDENTIAL

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EVERYTHING INCLUDED, DEFENSE SPENDING AS A PERCENTAGE OF GNP IS LESS THAN THREE PERCENT.

7 HUMAN RIGHTS. HAITI HAS MADE SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS IN THE OBSERVANCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS DURING THE PAST SEVERAL YEARS. THE INCREASED RESPECT FOR THE RIGHTS OF THE INDIVIDUAL LED TO THE RESUMPTION OF U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE AT A MINIMUM LEVEL IN 1975. THE PURPOSE OF THE RESUMPTION WAS TO ENCOURAGE THE GOH TO FURTHER IMPROVE ITS HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD. SINCE THAT TIME IT HAS PERMITTED AN ICRC VISIT TO THE NATIONAL PENITENTIARY; RELEASED ALL REMAINING POLITICAL PRISONERS; IMPROVED PRISON CONDITIONS; RATIFIED THE AMERICAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS; RECEIVED A VISIT FROM THE INTER-AMERICAN PRESS ASSOCIATION; AND INVITED THE INTER-AMERICAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION TO VISIT--NOW SCHEDULED FOR AUGUST 1978. THERE IS STILL, OF COURSE, MUCH ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT--LEGAL PROCEDURES AND GUARANTEES ARE FRAGILE AT BEST, ILL-EDUCATED LOCAL OFFICIALS STILL COMMIT ABUSES NO LONGER OFFICIALLY TOLERATED, AND NO GENUINE REPRESENTATIVE INSTITUTIONS EXIST.

THE MILITARY ASSISTANCE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE UNITED STATES IS HIGHLY PRIZED BY THE GOH AND IS AN IMPORTANT INDUCEMENT TO THE GOVERNMENT, AND PARTICULARLY TO THE INFLUENTIAL MILITARY OFFICERS WITHIN ITS RANKS, TO MAKE CONTINUED EFFORTS TO IMPROVE OBSERVANCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS. BOTH CIVILIAN AND MILITARY LEADERS WERE PROFOUNDLY SHOCKED WHEN WE INFORMED THEM OF A REFUSAL OF MUNITIONS EXPORT LICENSES FOR 600 HANDGUNS LAST DECEMBER IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE GOVERNMENT-INSPIRED BEATING OF A PROMINENT JOURNALIST. THUS THE SENSITIVITY OF THE GOVERNMENT TO OUR CONCERNS IS WELL-ESTABLISHED AND ANY SIGNIFICANT REDUCTION OF THE MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM IN THE ABSENCE OF HAITIAN BACKSLIDING ON HUMAN RIGHTS WOULD BE VIEWED BY THE GOH AS A BREACH OF FAITH.

8. MILITARY AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE FROM OTHER SOURCES. HAITI'S ONLY OTHER MILITARY RELATIONSHIP OF CONSEQUENCE IS CONFIDENTIAL

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WITH ISRAEL, FROM WHICH A SMALL AMOUNT OF MILITARY WEAPONS

AND TRAINING HAS BEEN PURCHASED. SOME MILITARY PERSONNEL HAVE RECEIVED TRAINING IN SPAIN AND PANAMA, BUT THIS IS NEGLIGIBLE. ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO HAITI HAS GROWN ALMOST EXPONENTIALLY IN THE LAST FIVE YEARS. TOTAL FOREIGN ASSISTANCE FLOWS ON AN ANNUAL LEVEL NOW APPROACH \$100 MILLION. THE MAJOR BILATERAL DONORS IN ADDITION TO THE U.S. ARE CANADA, FRANCE, WEST GERMANY, ISRAEL AND CHINA (TAIWAN). MULTILATERAL

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DONORS INCLUDE THE OAS, IDB, IBRD, IMF, UNDP, FAO, ILO, WHO (PAHO), IICA, ETC. THIS PLETHORA OF DONORS AND PROJECTS HAS LED TO THE CREATION OF A "JOINT COMMISSION", UNDER THE CHAIRMANSHIP OF THE OAS, WHICH MEETS ANNUALLY TO COORDINATE ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS AND TO DISCUSS PROBLEMS AFFECTING THEIR EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION--INCLUDING REFORM OF GOH ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES AND PROCEDURES.

9. PROGRAM LEVELS. AS NOTED ABOVE, OUR CURRENT PROGRAM WAS DESIGNED TO ACHIEVE OUR OBJECTIVES WITH A MINIMUM LEVEL OF COMMITMENT SO TO TALK OF LEVELS BELOW THIS IS A CONTRADICTION OF TERMS.

A) LEVEL 1 (MINIMUM LEVEL): AT THIS LEVEL THERE WOULD BE NO MAP ASSISTANCE OR FMS FINANCING. ONLY THE IMET PROGRAM WOULD OPERATE AT AN ANNUAL FUND LEVEL OF \$60,000. THIS WOULD PERMIT ACCESS TO U.S. MILITARY PME SCHOOLS FOR SEVERAL OFFI-

CERS AND WOULD KEEP OPEN SOME CHANNELS OF COMMUNICATIONS, ALTHOUGH A REDUCTION TO THIS LEVEL WOULD RISK LOSS OF ALL OUR CONTACTS WITH THE HAITIAN MILITARY. EVEN IF THIS ESSEN-  
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TIALLY SUB-MINIMAL LEVEL WERE NOT REJECTED BY THE GOH, WE COULD ONLY CONTRIBUTE IN A VERY LIMITED WAY TO DEVELOPING PROFESSIONALISM IN THE MILITARY OFFICER CORPS.

B) LEVEL 2 (INTERMEDIATE LEVEL): THIS LEVEL WOULD NOT INCLUDE MAP ASSISTANCE BUT WOULD INCLUDE FMS FINANCING OF \$100,000 ANNUALLY AND \$125,000 FOR THE IMET PROGRAM. AT THIS LEVEL SOME TECHNICAL TRAINING IN ADDITION TO THE PROFESSIONAL TRAINING COULD BE OBTAINED. THE INDICATED LEVEL OF FMS FINANCING WOULD PERMIT ACQUISITION OF SOME EQUIPMENT AND TRAINING THAT WOULD BE OTHERWISE UNOBTAINABLE. THIS REDUCED LEVEL OF ASSISTANCE RISKS THE TERMINATION OF U.S. CONTACT WITH THE HAITIAN MILITARY BUT, IF PERMITTED TO CONTINUE, WOULD ENABLE US TO ACHIEVE SOME OF OUR OBJECTIVES.

C) LEVEL 3 (CURRENT LEVEL): THIS LEVEL, WHICH STILL DOES NOT INCLUDE MAP ASSISTANCE BUT DOES INCLUDE FMS FINANCING OF \$500,000 ANNUALLY AND AN IMET PROGRAM OF \$250,000 IS CLOSE TO THE MINIMUM LEVEL AT WHICH WE CAN ACHIEVE OUR OBJECTIVES. AT THE SAME TIME IT APPROACHES THE MAXIMUM LEVEL OF ASSISTANCE WHICH THE HAITIAN MILITARY FORCES ARE AT PRESENT CAPABLE OF ABSORBING EFFICIENTLY. BENEFITS INCLUDE FREQUENT HIGH-LEVEL CONTACTS WITH THE OFFICER CORPS AND THE INFLUENCE EXERTED IN DEVELOPING A MILITARY SEARCH AND RESCUE CAPABILITY. THE RISK FACTOR HERE IS SLIGHT AS LONG AS WE AVOID AROUSING EXPECTATIONS OF SIGNIFICANT INCREASES IN TRAINING OPPORTUNITIES OR IN MEETING EQUIPMENT NEEDS OUTSIDE OUR CAREFULLY CIRCUMSCRIBED PROGRAM. IN ASSESSING THESE LEVELS WE REEMPHASIZE THAT THE HAITIAN PROGRAM WAS REINTRODUCED IN 1975 AT A MINIMUM LEVEL AS AN INDUCEMENT TO CONTINUED HUMAN RIGHTS IMPROVEMENTS. IT IS DIFFICULT, IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE, TO SCALE DOWN A PROGRAM ALREADY AT A MINIMUM LEVEL WITHOUT IMPLYING THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAS FAILED TO MEET OUR EXPECTATIONS.

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10. MANNING. THE USDAO IN PROT AU PRINCE HAS ONE USAF NCO AS THE SECURITY ASSISTANCE AUGMENTEE. THIS MANNING LEVEL IS CONSIDERED SUFFICIENT FOR LEVELS ONE, TWO AND THREE AS DESCRIBED ABOVE. HOWEVER, ANY INCREASE OVER CURRENT LEVELS OR FINANCING OR IMET TRAINING WOULD REQUIRE AN ADDITIONAL LOCAL HIRE SECRETARY TO ABSORB SOME OF THE UNCLASSIFIED

ADMINISTRATIVE TASKS.

11. TRAINING. ALL PROPOSED TRAINING IS FOR IMET RATHER THAN INDIGENOUS SOURCES, THIRD COUNTRIES OR FMS BECAUSE THE MILITARY FORCES WOULD OTHERWISE GO WITHOUT. THE CURRENT REGIME ACCORDS A LOW PRIORITY TO DEVELOPMENT OF THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT AND PROFESSIONAL TRAINING IS ALMOST NON-EXISTANT. SINCE HAITI IS THE POOREST COUNTRY IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE IT IS UNABLE TO PURCHASE ALL REQUIRED MILITARY TRAINING THROUGH FMS CASH SALES WITHOUT DETRACTING FROM OTHER PRIORITIES. UNDER THESE CONDITIONS, THE IMET PROGRAM IS HAITI'S ONLY RESOURCE FOR ADEQUATE TRAINING, AND IN TURN WE ARE ABLE TO CONTROL THE TYPE TRAINING THE HAITIANS RECEIVE.

12. RECOMMENDED PROGRAM LEVELS.

FY 80	FMS CREDIT	\$500,000
	IMET	300,000

FY 81	FMS CREDIT	\$500,000
	IMET	325,000

FY 82	FMS CREDIT	\$500,000
	IMET	350,000

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## Message Attributes

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